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Social Solidarity (2007-2013). This programme is managed by the Directorate-General for 
Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities of the European Commission. It was established 
to financially support the implementation of the objectives of the European Union in the employment 
and social affairs area, as set out in the Social Agenda, and thereby contribute to the achievement of 
the Lisbon Strategy goals in these fields. 
The seven-year Programme targets all stakeholders who can help shape the development of 
appropriate and effective employment and social legislation and policies, across the EU-27, EFTA-
EEA and EU candidate and pre-candidate countries. 
PROGRESS mission is to strengthen the EU contribution in support of Member States' commitments 
and efforts to create more and better jobs and to build a more cohesive society. To that effect, 
PROGRESS will be instrumental in: 
 providing analysis and policy advice on PROGRESS policy areas; 
 monitoring and reporting on the implementation of EU legislation and policies in PROGRESS 
policy areas; 
 promoting policy transfer, learning and support among Member States on EU objectives and 
priorities; and 
 relaying the views of the stakeholders and society at large 
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1 LABOUR MARKET SITUATION IN THE PEER COUNTRY  
This paper has been prepared for a Peer Review within the framework of the Mutual 
Learning Programme. It provides information on Belgium’s comments on the policy 
example of the Host Country for the Peer Review. For information on the policy example, 
please refer to the Host Country Discussion Paper. 
Belgium has a multi-layered federal system. Over the course of several decades, a series 
of constitutional reforms have devolved ever more powers to the regional authorities (both 
Regions and Communities). The federal government is still important with respect to the 
functioning of the labour market, not only concerning the legislation relating to work, but 
also concerning social security legislation (including the payment of unemployment 
benefits, and the establishment of numerous wage subsidy programmes). The Regions, on 
the other hand, also have wide powers regarding labour market related issues such as 
active labour market policy and the matching of demand and supply on the labour market 
through the (regional) Public Employment Services. The powers with respect to education 
and training have practically been devolved entirely, and are situated at the level of the 
Communities. 
The topic under review - the placement and training of tertiary education graduates - can 
therefore be situated at the interface of the different powers: Regions (placement), 
Communities (education and training) and partly also the Federal Government. When 
discussing the labour market situation in Belgium, we will therefore distinguish between the 
different Regions in Belgium (the distinction between Communities is less relevant here). 
As can be seen from the left hand side of table 1, the Belgian employment rate for persons 
with a tertiary education is comparable to the EU-27-average. The situation in the Walloon 
area as well as in Brussels is however somewhat less favourable. The right hand side of 
table 1 switches the attention towards the youngsters. Regarding the unemployment rate of 
young people aged 15-25, there is a huge difference between the north and the south of the 
country.  
Table 1: Employment rate of persons with tertiary education, unemployment rate of 
youngsters. 
 Employment rate, people with 
tertiary education 
Unemployment rate, 15-24 
 2009 2010 2009 2010 
Flemish Region 84.2 84.1 15.7 15.6 
Walloon Region 80.1 79.9 30.5 30.0 
Brussels 75.5 76.8 31.7 39.7 
Belgium 81.9 81.9 21.9 22.4 
EU-27 83.0 82.4 19.8 20.8 
FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
Whereas the unemployment rate for young people in Flanders is below the EU-27-average, 
for the Walloon area, and especially for Brussels, the situation is markedly worse. The 
employment rate for persons aged 15-24 (see left hand side of table 2) gives a similar 
picture (one should however bear in mind that the employment rate for this age group will 
be lower, given the higher share of young people participating in tertiary education).  
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Table 2: Employment rate for the age group 15-24 and the age group 55-64 
 Employment rate, 15-24 Employment rate, 55-64 
 2009 2010 2009 2010 
Flemish Region 28,6 28,8 35,8 38,2 
Walloon Region 21,8 22,0 32,7 35,1 
Brussels 19,1 16,6 42,3 40,6 
Belgium 25,3 25,2 35,3 37,3 
EU-27 35,1 34,1 46,0 46,3 
FOD Economie - Algemene Directie Statistiek - EAK, Eurostat LFS (Bewerking Steunpunt 
WSE/Departement WSE) 
The particularly high unemployment rates for youngsters in the Walloon area and in 
Brussels is one of the reasons why these Regions over the years have been inclined to 
favour labour market policies specifically targeted at young school leavers. In Flanders, this 
has been less of an issue. The right hand side of table 2, the employment rate of the age 
group 55-64, has been included to show that the labour market situation of older people is 
much more problematic in Flanders than the position of youngsters (always as compared to 
the EU-27-average). 
In the Walloon and Brussels areas, however, obviously there is a problem with the labour 
market absorption of young people. However, the question remains whether the young 
persons with a tertiary education are the ones who most urgently need to be helped. 
Unfortunately, the labour force statistics relating to unemployment (and employment) rates 
cannot show age group data by educational attainment. We therefore recur to another data 
source. VDAB, the Flemish public employment service, conducts an annual school leaver 
survey. Table 3 gives some results that relate to the entire population of persons who left 
education between 2008 and 2009.  
Table 3: The Situation of school leavers, 12 months later:  
 
Total number of school 
leavers 
% of whom are still in 
unemployment 12 months 
later 
All school leavers 76.603 14,60 
Tertiary education 30. 453 7,04 
Upper Secondary 34. 427 14,88 
Lower than upper secondary 11. 723 33,38 
VDAB Schoolverlatersenquête 2009 (School leavers survey) 
As can be seen, there is a strong relationship between educational attainment on the one 
hand, and the probability of continuing in unemployment 12 months after leaving education. 
These figures therefore strongly suggest that placement help for young persons should be 
in the first place targeted at the low-skilled. 
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2 ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICY MEASURE  
In Belgium, there are no labour market policy measures targeted specifically at tertiary 
education graduates. There are however several policy measures which are comparable to 
the 'Scheme for the job placement and training of tertiary-education graduates', in that they 
are targeted at the placement of young people, and often do have a training content. 
2.1 First Job Agreement 
The first policy initiative is called Startbaanovereenkomst/ Convention premier emploi/ 
Erstbeschäftigungsverträge (First Job Agreement), and it is organized by the Federal 
Government. This longstanding program actually has two main pillars: on the one hand 
there is an obligation for employers in the private for-profit sector with more than 50 
employees to engage a given number of younger employees (at least 3 % of all employees 
should be less than 26 years old). On the other hand, the employer can obtain a subsidy for 
employing (low skilled) young employees. 
When engaging a 'low-skilled' youngster (i.e. having no higher secondary education), the 
employer will obtain a reduction in social security contributions of 1000€ per quarter for the 
first eight quarters (two years), and 400€ in all subsequent quarters, until the employee 
reaches the age of 26. When engaging a 'very low-skilled' youngster (with a lower 
educational attainment), the reduction of 1000€ per quarter can be obtained for 15 quarters, 
and becomes 400€ in all subsequent quarters, until the employee reaches the age of 26. 
If the 'very low-skilled' youngster in addition was unemployed when engaged, part of his or 
her unemployment benefit (i.e. 350€) will be paid to the employer during the first five 
months of the engagement.  
Within a First Job Agreement, part-time working can be combined with part-time training or 
even with part-time participation in regular education. 
Conclusion: this scheme forces bigger employers to engage employees younger than 26. 
There are only financial benefits if the employee is low-skilled. Working under this scheme 
can be combined with training/education in a flexible way. Employers who engage less than 
50 employees can also make use of the scheme, but have no obligation to do so. In 2007, 
in the private profit sector some 278,250 youngsters below 26 were employed (in FTE). 
Within this group, there were 44,637 FTE First Job Agreements (52,791 persons, 47% of 
whom worked for an employer with more than 50 employees).  
2.2 Win-win Activa plan 
The Activa-plan of the Federal Government aims to encourage employers to engage long-
term unemployed persons. While the Activa-plan in general is not targeted specifically on 
youngsters, the Win-win-Activa-plan (which is part of the general Activa-plan) has some 
special arrangements to encourage the engagement of youngsters below 26. In general, for 
youngsters who have been unemployed for at least 12 months, the employer will receive a 
monthly work benefit of 500€, for 16 months. If they do not have a higher secondary 
education degree, and have been unemployed for at least three months, the employer will 
receive a monthly benefit of 1100€, for 12 months, for engagements that took place in 
2011. For youngsters who have at most a higher secondary education degree and have 
been unemployed for at least six months, there will be a monthly benefit of 1000€ for 12 
months. 
Over and above this monthly work benefit (which is paid by the organization that is 
responsible for the payment of the unemployment benefits, and therefore is called 'an 
activation of the unemployment benefit'), employers will receive a temporary reduction of 
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social security contributions for all youngsters who were unemployed for at least 12 months 
before being hired. 
2.3 IBO 
IBO is the abbreviation of 'Individuele beroepsopleiding in de onderneming' (Individual 
vocational training within the enterprise). IBO is a policy measure in the northern part of 
Belgium, under the powers of the Flemish Government. However, an equivalent policy 
measure exists in the other Regions of the country, the Plan „formation insertion‟ in the 
Walloon Region and the Formation Professionnelle Individuelle d'intégration en entreprise 
in Brussels. This co-existence is not surprising since the measure activates the 
unemployment benefit, and the unemployment benefit regulation falls under the Federal 
Government. 
Basically, IBO is individual on-the-job vocational training with a duration between one and 
six months. Only persons who are in unemployment can participate. In principle, an IBO will 
only take place if there is a need for the firm to organize the training itself, e.g. because of 
specific needs or because no equivalent training is offered by the regular training providers.  
The employer has to select the unemployed person and has to provide the training. During 
the entire IBO-training, the employer receives the equivalent of the unemployment benefit. 
The trainee receives a wage that consists of two parts. The first part is the unemployment 
benefit that he or she received prior to the start of the IBO. In addition, the employer has to 
pay a so-called productivity premium which increases as the training advances. In the last 
month of the training, the sum of these two parts should be equivalent to what is the 
common wage for a comparable job. An important condition of the IBO-agreement is that 
the employer has to offer the former trainee a job at the end of the training.  
The IBO-agreement is not specifically restricted to young unemployed people. However, 
due to the fact that the employer can select the trainee, the population that participates in 
IBO is quite selective. In an evaluation of all IBO-agreements (97,942) concluded between 
January 2000 and October 2008, it was found that more than 55% of all IBO-agreements 
related to persons who were 25 or younger
1
. More than 50% were unemployed for less 
than three months, and barely 17% of the trainees were long-term unemployed. As to 
educational attainment, the sample was less selective, although the selectivity was 
increasing over the time span of the research.  
2.4 Similar or different? 
According to the host country discussion paper, 80% of the Cyprian secondary school 
graduates enroll in tertiary education. From table 3 it can be deduced that this percentage is 
lower in the northern part of Belgium. The same goes for the southern part of Belgium. 
This is probably the reason why Belgian labour market policy, as compared to Cyprus, has 
traditionally been less preoccupied with youngsters with tertiary education. To the extent 
that the Belgian labour market policies target youngsters, it is predominantly the low-skilled 
youngsters who are targeted. 
3 ASSESSMENT OF THE SUCCESS FACTORS AND 
TRANSFERABILITY  
Given the specific labour market situation in Belgian, there is not much scope to introduce a 
policy measure akin to the 'Scheme for the job placement and training of tertiary-education 
graduates'. As far as Flanders, the northern part of Belgium, is concerned, there does not 
                                                     
1
 Bollens, J. & Heylen, V., De Individuele beroepsopleiding in de Onderneming. Vergelijking van het 
deelnameprofiel en de effectiviteit over de periode 2000-2008, Steunpunt WSE, 2009, 50 p. 
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even seem to be a need to introduce additional policies targeted on the young unemployed, 
although an exception can be made for very specific subgroups such as the very low-skilled 
youngsters and other groups for whom participation in the labour market is difficult, such as 
migrant youngsters and some youngsters with a disability. In Brussels and the Walloon 
Region, the situation is different since they are faced with a substantial youth 
unemployment problem: whereas the youth employment rate is relatively low in Flanders 
and youth unemployment duration tends to be relatively shorter, the youth employment rate 
is relatively high in the two other regions, and the duration of youth unemployment tends to 
be relatively long in these regions
2
. Furthermore, the youth unemployment problem in these 
two regions is markedly worse for the low-skilled as compared to the high-skilled 
youngsters, further obviating the need to introduce a scheme specifically targeted at the 
youngsters with tertiary education.  
Besides this efficiency argument, an equity argument can also be given for not introducing 
a scheme specifically targeted at youngsters with tertiary education. In Belgium, the private 
cost of participating in higher education is relative low, implying that it is society which bears 
the largest part of the cost. This implies that the rate of return on investment in tertiary 
education for the individual is substantial. In a lifetime perspective, this return will easily 
offset the private costs, even if one takes the opportunity cost of participation - not being 
able to earn an income when participating - into account. Adding up, as compared to those 
who did not participate in tertiary education, those who participate in tertiary education are 
favoured three times: they receive a substantial subsidy in their educational investment, 
they will on average receive a much higher wage, and they have a far higher probability of 
being absorbed by the labour market. Given this state of affairs, one can hardly defend the 
need to let society invest yet more in policies to increase their placement probability. 
In the host country discussion paper, it is argued that the scheme helps 'to bridge the gap 
between [...] the decision of students to follow a certain course of studies and the needs of 
the economy at a given period of time' (p. 32). In as far as 'mainly the aptitudes and 
attitudes of students and parents are responsible for this failure to have a good matching of 
demand and supply of skills' (p.20), it is questionable whether it is a good idea to establish 
a special subsidy scheme to counteract this mismatch, because in that case neither 
students nor parents get an incentive to alter their apparently inefficient choice behavior. 
But there is more to say about this mismatching problem. In general, one would expect that 
someone with a tertiary education degree will have obtained two kinds of skills: on the one 
hand rather general, generic skills that apply across a large variety of jobs (like ICT-skills, 
communication skills, problem solving skills, etc.) and on the other hand more specific 
professional skills that are needed to be able to practice the profession(s) the particular  
tertiary education is preparing for (compare e.g. the technical skills necessary to be an 
accountant or to be a nurse). Over and above the generic skills and the general 
professional skills, a lot of employers will find that a new employee will be missing some 
additional skills which they find to be necessary to practice the specific job in their 
organization. These often will be very job-specific and even organization-specific skills 
(which can only partly be transferred to another organization or another employer).  While 
these job-specific and organization-specific skills will have to be learned by all new recruits, 
one can easily argue that workers with more work-experience often will be quicker to adopt 
these skills as compared to recent graduates without work experience. 
Now, to further the argument, the reason why a tertiary education often takes three or more 
years to complete, is that professions are becoming increasingly complex and therefore one 
has to devote quite some time to learning the necessary professional skills (the same goes 
for the generic skills, but these can be neglected for the time being, as we assume that all 
tertiary education programmes will invest in a comparable set of generic skills).  
                                                     
2
 OCDE, Des emplois pour les jeunes. Belgique, 2007, 117 pp. 
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Given that the Cypriot scheme provides for a training program of a 6 or 12 month duration 
(p.13), and given that 80% of the graduate's working time is considered as training time 
(p.14), it is rather unlikely that this relatively short program will be able to give the trainee an 
entirely new set of professional skills. Therefore it is hard to believe the claim that this 
scheme is another cushion to rectify the problem created by the fact that students choose 
fields and specializations that do not correspond to the future needs of the economy (p. 20).  
While a 6 or 12 months duration is too short to learn new professional skills on a tertiary 
education level, a training programme with this duration gives ample time to learn the job-
specific and the organization skills. We are inclined to think that this scheme is indeed 
about these skills. If this indeed would be the case, another rather fundamental problem 
emerges, as it is rather hard to find an economic rationale as to why these costs should be 
borne by society and not by the individual employer. 
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4 QUESTIONS 
 How does the labour market success of Cyprian youngsters without a tertiary education 
degree compare to the experience of those with a tertiary education degree? 
 On page 16 of the host country paper, some results of an ex-post evaluation of the 
Scheme are given. The figures are based on "interviews of 59.8 % of graduates who 
successfully completed the Scheme". How many graduates does this represent in 
absolute numbers? What is to be understood by "not-successfully" completing the 
Scheme? Is this sample of 59.8 % random or not? 
 On page 16, it is mentioned somewhat intriguingly that "from the ex-post evaluation of 
the scheme one can deduce that there is no serious deadweight problem". What is 
meant by this, and in what way can this be deduced from the evaluation results? 
 In as far as 'mainly the aptitudes and attitudes of students and parents are responsible 
for the failure to have a good matching of demand and supply of skills' (p.20), would it 
not be a good idea to steer the choice of study more directly though price- or quantity 
mechanisms (e.g. by making less demanded areas of study more expensive or by 
quota)? 
 The host country discussion paper appropriately raises the question "when education 
and training of labour finish". Given that people are getting older and have longer 
careers, and given that the pace of societal and technological change is still increasing, 
one no longer can posit that what was learned at the beginning of the career will be 
sufficient to reach pension age without being updated regularly. Instead of making the 
initial training longer (e.g. by putting recently graduated youngsters back into training, 
as the Scheme does), would it not be better to compress the initial education and use 
the savings to organize educational updates during the career? 
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ANNEX 1: SUMMARY TABLE  
Labour market situation in the Peer Country 
 Belgium is a country with a multi-layered federal system 
 In the southern part and in Brussels, youth unemployment is a substantial problem 
 In the northern part of the country, youth unemployment is less of an issue 
 Youth unemployment is a low-skill problem, tertiary education graduates are not affected 
Assessment of the policy measure 
 Within the Belgian labour market policies, several are targeted at youngsters 
 These programmes often do have a training content 
 Two federal programmes give financial incentives to encourage the engagement of low-
skilled youngsters 
 A regional programme encourages on-the-job training of (young) unemployed  
Assessment of success factors and transferability 
 As youth unemployment is a problem of the low-skilled, there is no need for a programme 
targeted on tertiary education graduates 
 Apart from efficiency grounds, this claim also rests on grounds of equity 
 The Cyprian scheme possibly gives wrong incentives as to the study choice decision 
 Arguments are put forward as to why the cost of this scheme should not be borne by 
society 
Questions 
 Labour market situation of youngsters without tertiary education degree? 
 In what way can the absence of deadweight be deduced? 
 Why not steer study choice behaviour more directly? 
 Life long learning instead of learning when young? 
 
 
